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RECURRENT NUISANCES AND STATUTES
OF LIMITATION IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION
ACTIONS
The right of a landowner to compensation in an inverse condemna-
tion action may be as variable as the vagaries of the particular state
statutory and constitutional scheme permit. When a cause of action
does arise, the landowner's task is to keep his case within these pro-
visions. If the inverse condemnation action is based on recurrent dam-
age to real property, the claimant may find himself barred by the
statute of limitations if the court decides that the cause of action
accrued with earlier damage on which the statutory period has run.
In the Tennessee case of Murphy v. Raleigh Utility District,' a daily
effluent from defendant's utility plant washed across plaintiff's land
and caused severe erosion. Plaintiff alleged that the invasions had
continued for several years and asked for an injunction and for dam-
ages. The court denied both remedies, holding that the one-year
Statute of Limitations governing inverse condemnation actions2
barred any relief. In the principal case, the result should have de-
pended on the court's determination of when the recurring invasions
resulted in such a substantial deprivation of property rights that there
was a taking which gave rise to a cause of action for inverse condem-
nation. The court held that the recurrent invasions gave rise to only
one cause of action based on the first taking, and not to successive
causes of action with each subsequent invasion after the first taking,
but the rationale for its opinion is not clear, and the court does not
indicate when the plaintiff's property was first taken.
The answer to the question of when the "taking" occurs ordinarily
determines when the Statute of Limitations begins to run. While the
concept of a "taking" has received widely differing judicial interpre-
tations, the view that a taking requires an actual physical expulsion,
or at the other extreme, that it only requires an interference with a
property right, has been largely discredited3 Most courts now hold
1. 213 Tenn. 228, 373 S.W.2d 455 (1963).
2. Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-1424 (1955): The owner of land shall, in such
cases, commence proceedings within twelve (12) months after the land has been
actually taken possession of, and the work of the proposed internal improvement
begun....
3. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 1 (1966).
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that while there need be no actual physical expulsion, the interference
with the property right must be substantial and usually permanent in
character.4 Variations among these views probably reflect the con-
fusion between "property" as the right to use and dispose of land and
the popular concept of "property" as the land itself. While either of
these interests might conceivably be involved in a condemnation
action, "property" as a right to use and dispose of land is probably
a more useful concept in this context because in the inverse situation
the land is not physically appropriated by the condemning authority.
Murphy does not indicate when the taking in that case occurred.
If the majority view were followed, the cause of action arose with the
first permanent impairment of the owner's right to use and dispose
of his property. Physical damage to the property itself would then be
required, especially since the complaint in Murphy was based on
nuisance, and such an action requires substantial injury.5 However, a
finding of a taking was not crucial in Murphy because the court
placed its decision on a construction of the Statute of Limitations and
did not choose to reach the taking issue.
Was the court's decision the most desirable solution to the problem
of recurring damage in inverse causes? There is considerable authority
for the view that a cause of action resulting from a recurrent nuisance
is barred only by the running of the statute against each invasion.6
Perhaps the choice between this theory and the Murphy result should
depend in some part upon the kind of relief sought. For example, in
the Murphy case the plaintiff was denied both damages and injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance, impliedly giving the defendant a prescrip-
tive right to continue the nuisance. Probably for this reason some
cases7 have held that the Statute of Limitations cannot be pleaded to
an action for injunctive relief against a nuisance. Similarly, other
cases8 would allow successive actions for damages when the defendant
could have abated the nuisance at any time but did not do so.
While the rationale of the Murphy decision is not clearly disclosed
by the opinion, the Tennessee supreme court by implication in that
4. East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.
1949).
5. Smith v. Erie R. Co., 134 Ohio 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938).
6. Anderson v. Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C. 37, 164 S.E. 583 (1932).
7. Vowinckel v. N. Clark & Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 P.2d 733 (1932); Barrow
v. Gaillardanne, 122 La. 558, 47 So. 891 (1908).
8. Pinkerton v. Pritchard, 71 Ariz. 117, 223 P.2d 933 (1950); Burleyson v.
Western and Atlantic R.R. Co., 91 Ga. App. 745, 87 S.E.2d 166 (1955).
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decision and explicitly elsewhere9 has recognized new causes of action
for recurrent damage only when the damage was negligently caused
and unanticipated. The recurrent damage in Murphy was character-
ized as intentional and apparent. Thus, in a case'0 in which a moun-
tainside stream was negligently blocked by debris from defendant's
pipeline operations and recurrently flooded plaintiff's property, the
court held that the cause of action survived the bar of the one-year
statute even though the first flooding occurred previous to one year
before filing. The court emphasized that the later floodings were "un-
anticipated eventualities" from the plaintiff's point of view, but it is
hard to extend that reasoning past the first or second floodings. This
type of reasoning is not particularly valuable in cases of recurrent
nuisance for the simple reason that it is not sufficiently oriented to-
wards reaching just decisions in cases like Murphy in which the dam-
age was not negligently caused.
Resolving the time barrier issues raised in the Murphy case is diffi-
cult, since a holding either way may be unjust to one or the other of
the parties when considerable time has elapsed since the date of the
first damage. One partial solution, which will help to avoid retro-
active judicial determinations of the effect of the limitations statute,
is simply to provide for a longer statutory period when the inverse
action is based on recurring invasions of property. Otherwise, unless
a court takes the relatively artificial approach of the Murphy opinion,
it will have to deal with each case on the equities.
Jasper N. Edmundson
9. Donohue v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 39 Tenn. App. 438, 284 S.W.2d
692 (1955).
10. Id.
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